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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE: TRANSFORMING TRAUMA, REWRITING
IDENTITY IN GLORIA ANZALDUA’S “BORDERLANDS/LA FRONTERA” AND
“LIGHT IN THE DARK/LUZ EN LO OSCURO”
by
Richard E. Riley
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Ana Luszczynska, Major Professor
Gloria Anzaldua’s “Borderlands/La Frontera” and “Light in the Dark/Luz en lo
Oscuro” are widely acknowldged as groundbreaking texts across Latinx literary canons,
invoking selfhood, spirituality, activism, and politics as a queer woman of color writer.
Her language around self-dispersion is still undertheorized in what it owes to
traumatic experiences discoverable in the self, body, world, and culture Anzaldua hails
from. The extent of colonizing and kyriarchal damage in her work has been recognized;
but the exact character of how these breakages and corresponding imperatives to
regenerate oneself resemble a traumatic shock remains to be written about.
This thesis sketches frameworks appropriate to the task, employing
phenomenology, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, and theories of trauma and testimony
alongside Anzaldua. Connections between each intellectual movement are uncovered in
juxtaposition with Anzaldua’s texts, and novel readings arise with respect to Anzaldua’s
worldview and the internal logic of death, pain, and rebirth unique to her experiences.
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Introduction
The writings of Chicana feminist thinker Gloria Anzaldua have over the past
thirty years gradually been welcomed not only into the canon of Latinx literature and
philosophy, but into the wider world of cultural and language studies. Anzaldua’s thought
has influenced movements in indigenous and third-world feminisms, and contributed new
insights to our knowledge of writing & rhetoric, religious studies, and queer theory. But
Anzaldua’s work, in my estimation, is much more than an object for academic study: it is
a self-portrait, a log of the internecine battle one human-being has undergone in the fight
for their own self-worth, wrenched from the maw of a society bent on their destruction. It
is a painstaking repository of the wounds she has felt branded into her body, in the literal
sense of flesh and in the larger metaphorical sense of culture, history, and world, and the
process of a recovery wrung out from the older selves preceding every possible future
one. And every step of this fight is mapped out, like a manual, with its readers in mind, a
relation of discourses as well as events from the author’s personal life, with one goal in
mind: a toolkit for a collective ritualizing of her own process. Anzaldua’s writings
indicate a deep connection to one’s heritage and upbringing, a past stretching from
childhood into adult life, careful and vigilant for the atoms of spirit and asteroids of
traumatic experience around every corner. It is this connection, this faculty enabling a
reading of the world entirely given to her own survival, which produces a testimony and
artistry seen only in the likes of other greats from the Black and Latinx traditions;
Anzaldua makes herself possible, and she achieves this by rewriting the book on survival,
on pain and wounds and creativity, and the limits of the imagination.
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Arriving to her writing with the right context and mindset will make the
aforementioned threads more apparent. In the spirit of facilitating this understanding, this
thesis will undertake an explication and recontextualization of multiple academic
discourses: phenomenology through Martin Heidegger, deconstruction through Jacques
Derrida, psychoanalytic theories of trauma through Sigmund Freud and Cathy Caruth,
and premises regarding the acts of testimony and bearing witness borrowed from
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub. The result will be a framework better equipped to read
Anzaldua for the innovations distinct to her work, in addition to ensuring a firm
theoretical grounding in several discourses already established for their credible
interventions and epistemologies.
If the lenses are manifold, the object is singular: traumatic experience, and its
effect and relation to the self. While apparently straightforward enough a matter, the
reality hardly is. As Lucy Bond & Stef Craps point out in their survey The New Critical
Idiom: Trauma, the traumatic experience “is slippery: blurring the boundaries between
mind and body, memory and forgetting, speech and silence.” (Bond & Craps, 5) It is
abundantly clear the type of delicacy required by an inquiry into traumatic memory and
interpretation, and the consequent nuance and intricacy of a phenomenon that continues
to elude the grasp of most advanced theoretical frameworks.
It is this aspect of traumatic experience that phenomenology and deconstruction
can make good on their analytic promise about. A close-up on the lived experiences
linked to traumatic recollection and repetition discloses certain kinks and quirks unseen
by a generalized discursive or psychoanalytic treatment of the phenomenon from the
outside: the absolute alterity of repressed memories to my awareness; the processes of

2

meaning-disruption and creation a survivor experiences; a more ethical type of listening
that precludes a myriad of medicalizing and pathologizing practices that make up the
byproducts of certain scientific discourses; and the direct and firsthand relating of my
experience qua testimony to others. Psychoanalysis, for its part, adds its developed
corpus of concepts from which much discourse surrounding trauma gets its start from,
with Caruth and Felman putting a new twist on old news and thereby injecting fresh
blood into the conversation.
Phenomenology does have its limits — in particular with its subject-centered and
Cartesian proclivity for describing consciousness — and yes, poststructuralism and other
cognate theoretical frameworks have achieved much in questioning the dominance of
subject-centered philosophies through western intellectual history. The quandary relevant
to these books, however, has everything to do with intersubjective hermeneutics, which is
to say that the subject being understood or misunderstood crisscrosses matters of
representation and meaning with real material stakes; the tendencies of the latest trends in
studies of collective culture and discourse run headlong into a direct confrontation with
particular, individual experience. The care and concentration applied to lived experience
in phenomenological reading combined with the anti-essentializing and anti-structural
aspects of deconstruction make for a mobile analytic, one that can be pinned up for long
enough to center the subject’s lived experience without sacrificing resiliency and
openness to historical contingency. It is an acknowledgement of an awe at the brute
presence of others within our meaningful milieu, and their unrepresentable being at the
frontiers of our own subjectivity.
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The question of bearing witness and the presence of others is thus resolutely
entangled in lived experience and language, in text and body, a sort of inscribed
corporeality. The balancing of “the internal and the external, the private and the public,
the individual and the collective” (Bond & Craps, 5) that Bond & Craps point out as the
threshold space of trauma not only straddles the descriptions of self, temporality,
discourse, and lived-world characteristic of phenomenology, and the dream-work,
repression, ego-formation, and repetition compulsions posited by psychoanalysis. These
two discourses also intersect with a third, one more incisive than phenomenology while
being just as, if not more, sui generis than psychoanalysis. Gloria Anzaldua’s works
Borderlands/La Frontera and Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro themselves open up
into the third space she theorizes, incorporating properties from both domains of thought
and staking out their own territory within a theory or writing the self into the body,
regenerating one’s worldedness in the course of healing deep psychic wounds caused by
those same factical circumstances. In putting into practice a regimen of deep psychic
introspection and conflict-resolution, Anzaldua’s accomplishment consists in a
construction reflected from personal materials; through writing, she seamlessly
incorporates and accomodates theoretical conclusions of others with her own living
existence theory, a body-narrative befitting the term “auto-theory”. In taking on the task
of theorizing, writing, on oneself (i.e. about oneself and on oneself, one’s body)
Anzaldua integrates concepts in both traditions while surpassing many of their limits. She
supplies valuable alternatives to a theorizing of trauma, including the role writing has on
bodily motions, processes, and contexts, and opens the way for Post-Cartesian ontology.
Most important of all perhaps is her transcendence of divisions between theory and praxis
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by way of her autohistoria, leaving the boundaries of abstract and generalized theoretical
writing behind for a more personalized, and therefore energized and impactful, mode. In
order to better comprehend Anzaldua’s groundbreaking step forward, a walk-through of
certain theoretical frameworks and their findings will precede the reading of the two texts
themselves. We will overview the work of Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Sigmund
Freud, Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub before advancing to
Borderlands/La Frontera and Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro. Starting off with
Heidegger, an analysis of human subjectivity as irrevocably concerned with practical
connections to one’s world and to others, and itself constituted in time, will underlay our
elaborations into the nature of trauma, its wounds to the self, and what recovery — or in
her case, reconstruction — may look like.

Dasein and the Remembering of Time1
What does human-being or human subjectivity resemble more: an immortal
kernel descended from a supraphysical plane, pure and inalterable during its stay in the
material world; or a shifting, indeterminate, nonspecific material? Is it whole and unified,
an entity surviving the flesh and ascending into the firmament upon death? Or does our
finitude hang off our bones, defining our every act and project? German philosopher
Martin Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) takes up this question in both its most radical
and its most primordial form: what is Being? And what does it mean to be?

Heidegger’s magnum opus, Being and Time eludes all facile articulations. It is, for the purposes of a
chapter of this length, an unfathomable complex of analysis. Given the practical limits of a thesis of this
nature, a sophisticated and exhaustive explanation of Heidegger’s existential analytic will prove just as
elusive, and by design outside of our scope. Therefore, the author appeals to the reader’s understanding if
some holes in explanation are left unfilled. Certain presuppositions are inevitable in all written work, and
this critical read be no different.
1
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But first: how can such a fundamental question -- what Heidegger, in fact, refers
to as the fundamental ontological question — be both radical and primordial? The
answer is simple: it is radical for being so primordial, so closely interlaced with our direct
experience and the questioning itself. This direct and primordial encounter with our
existential subjectivity is not something we’re accustomed to, nor in fact ever fully
prepared for, given what Heidegger refers to as our “falling-prey-to”, the condition we
always already discover ourselves in as subjects thrown into a world not of our own
making, one in which all of our agreements are assumed, our conformity is
uncontradicted, and our complacency is obscured even to ourselves. To Heidegger, this
falling-prey is a fact of human subjectivity, a quality he refers to as an “existential”
common to all subjective human experience.
The reason for this fundamental questioning is also simple in its explanation,
while radical in its assumptions and implications. The reason is this: Heidegger wants to
return to asking this fundamental question, one that has been erased from the history of
metaphysics after a suite of what he considers unacknowledged and ignored missteps.
But in the way of this question is a questioning of the questioner themselves — who is
asking this question of Being? And what is their being? He decides that any ontological
question — that is, one questioning what it means for any given thing to be — requires
an understanding of ontology that can only be arrived at through the being that represents
the kind of questioning towards the world that ontology represents, and this is only to be
found in “Dasein”2. Heidegger will spend the remainder of Being and Time outlining the

In the German, transliterated as “being-there”. One of Heidegger’s most radical repositionings is against
the Humanist articulation of human-being, one concerned with a strong and indomitable core essence of
humanity seemingly outside of time in its eternity. Heidegger’s position is more radically intriguing: the
2
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existential features of Dasein, his re-conception of human-being, and its fundamental
structuring as temporality itself. While Heidegger has not entirely answered his own
question by the end of the book, what he has done in the interim is produce a
pathbreaking reconstruction of the essence of human-being by eradicating the
metaphysics standing in his way.
What, however, do these metaphysics consist of? And what is it about human
essence that Heidegger is fooling around with in the first place? Here the answer becomes
complex, while remaining deceptively simple. Heidegger believes not just metaphysics,
but institutional research of the empirical sort (what we call the modern sciences, both
humanistic and physical) is constantly undergoing a revitalization of its core concepts.
This is because their objects of study, whether mathematical formulas, plant species, or
human societies, are always already re-examining the very subjects they first looked at to
produce their organizing principles. This is happening unconsciously: Heiddegger just
thinks that we must acknowledge these objects of study as themselves beings, as objects
that are ontologically interesting when it comes to asking the question: what is a being?
What is this particular being’s being?3 And philosophical metaphysics since the Greeks,
to be clear, has misnamed or outright misunderstood the object of study for a
fundamental ontology. What it has misunderstood is “time” itself. Lines have been drawn
in the sand between temporal and atemporal beings, what western metaphysical discourse

first defining feature of Dasein is the fact that “in its being this being is concerned about its very being.”
(11)
3

Being and Time, p.9
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has concerned itself with in past millennia4, while overlooking the critical overlap
between what it means to be as time for human-beings, or Dasein. What is most critical
among his findings is the re-seating of temporality as the essence of human-being, thus
dethroning essence itself as something timeless and ideal as a project for understanding
human nature. Dasein must revive, by its own questioning, its awareness of its own
being-as-time, as that is constituted as being-in, worldedness, care, ekstasis, and
historicity.

Being-in, Worldedness, and Care
To adequately make sense of Heidegger’s core existential framework -- Dasein’s
being as “care” -- we must begin with an analysis of what there is for us to take care of.
To this end, he will embark on an analysis of world and reality as to what their primordial
existential significance is for concrete human existence, and in the process break down
objectified notions of world that do not take into account human-beings direct encounter
with other beings.
Following this thread, “worldedness” is a key term we cannot avoid. In pursuing
the ontic-ontological distinction and his corresponding focus on the analysis of the
ontological conditions of human-being, Heidegger wants to re-appraise our historic
understanding of “world” and “reality” not as mere beings that exist, objectively and
without our contribution, but as they reveal themselves in their Be-ing to Dasein, the

“‘Time’ has long served as the ontological – or rather ontic – criterion for naively distinguishing the
different regions of beings. ‘Temporal’ beings (natural processes and historical events) are separated from
‘atemporal’ beings (spatial and numerical relationships). We are accustomed to distinguishing the
‘timeless’ meaning of propositions from the ‘temporal’ course of propositional statements.” (18)
4
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existential processes whereby we make sense of the objects and people we exist through
and as. By way of clarification, Heidegger specifies that “worldedness”, to him, means
not the “totality of beings which can be objectively present within the world” (Heidegger,
64) nor even the ontology of those same beings and the multiplicity thereof. Instead,
Heidegger’s suggestion is to conceive of “worldedness” as “that ‘in which’ a factical
Dasein ‘lives’ as Dasein.” (Heidegger, 65) It is, fundamentally and foremost, a “kind of
being of Dasein, never a kind of being of something objectively present ‘in’ the world.”
(Heidegger, 65) What we uncover as “objectively present”, those objects which we posit
as existing prior to our subjective encounters with them, are actually not the most
primordial means of being-in as Dasein that we exist in. Heidegger’s response to this
objectifying tendency is to remind us of the “handiness” of things as we respond and
react to them in our being-in-the-world. In our “dealings” with the worlds of our being-in,
we answer to other beings in our taking-care in a utilitarian sort of fashion, as things in
their pragmatics disclose themselves in relation to our own being. For instance, we do not
primordially evaluate a chair as a block of upholstered wood with four legs and in a
mahogany finish, but as a useful “means” to our potential sitting on it or standing up
away from it. And these orders of reference are never singular, but manifold, the
referentiality of which Heidegger calls “circumspection”. (68-9)5 This circumspection, as
we will learn, becomes explicit only in the exposure to references among beings-at-hand
that signs provide.

“Conspicuousness”, “obtrusiveness”, and “obstinancy” are three modes of the dysfunction of our
everyday useful dealings with objects. These moments of discord with our useful objects disclose our exact
factical involvement with innerworldly beings in Daseins peculiar form of subjectivity.
5
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Co-extensive with our practical dealings as beings-in-the-world and what we find
useful or serviceable in our everyday existence are signs and indications, and the sphere
of reference in which they operate. Indeed, “Signs are not things which stand in an
indicating relationship to another thing” Heidegger asserts; “rather, they are useful things
which explicitly bring a totality of useful things to circumspection so that the worldly
character of what is at hand makes itself known at the same time.” (78) The primacy of
signs lies in their disclosure of reference relations among handy objects, and the circle of
signification they are responsive and connected to.
The second of Heidegger’s critical interventions constitutes the existential
analytic of Dasein as “being-in”, that is, a being fundamentally “taking-care-of” that
which constitutes its worldedness. To dispel a misconception from go, Heidegger
clarifies that the word “in” does not indicate an “objective” or spatial being to be found in
or as a place, but a kind of being on a different order than what he calls mere
“innerworldly beings”6. Dasein’s being is in, and uniquely distinct from inanimate
objects in the world around it, on account of its facticity and care-structure -- what
amounts to its collected factical circumstances, where and when it finds itself existing in
geography, culture, race, gender, etc, and the concern it has for what makes up its
environment, meaningful surroundings, and fellow human-beings. In other words, “The
being which is essentially constituted by being-in-the-world is itself always its ‘there.’”
(129) That is to say that the being whose essence is existence and existing – what for
Heidegger means flowing and changing as time – what makes this being itself is where it

“...being-in not as an attribute of an objectively present subject effected or even just
triggered by the objective presence of the ‘world’; rather, being-in essentially as the kind of being of this
being itself.” (128)
6
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finds itself, its “there”, the aforementioned factical circumstances it must always already
be inhabiting and negotiating. No subject, no human-being, is exempt from the
particularity of their historical experiences.
Heidegger notes that the makeup of being-in can be characterized as tantamount
to the descriptions of two co-constitutive existential characteristics of Dasein:
“attunement” and “understanding”. These are equiprimordial, a term Heidegger uses to
emphasize the non-particular and unsourceable character of each existential to Dasein’s
being. Attunement is nothing less than Dasein’s manifestation of its facticity and
thrownness, its sometimes acute, sometimes latent, and always pre-cognized state of
response and inhabitation according to the world in which it resides. This response can
be referred to as “moodiness”, the sense in which our attunement takes the form of
affective attachments to our surroundings that, in turn, disclose our relation as being-in in
a particular manner or mode, and that display themselves pre-cognitively, beneath our
everyday awareness. Mood, according to Heidegger, “has always already disclosed
being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself towards
something.” (emphasis original, 133). In other words, moods are our first line of contact
with the world. Except that we are neither separate from our moods, nor are our moods
separate from the bed they spring forth from, our worldedness, leaving us more
holistically trussed to our facticity than a subject-object dichotomy can reasonably
explain.
Understanding is the second of what Heidegger considers the two existentials
comprising being-in. This is the fundamental ground of what it means to be as Dasein, as
a being taking-care-of its world. Summarizing his earlier deductions, he states: “Being-in
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is “there” as that for the sake of which Dasein is. Existing being-in-the-world as such is
disclosed in the for-the-sake-of-which, and we called this disclosedness understanding.”
(emphasis mine, 139) Significance and the for-the-sake-of-which, i.e. possibility, are the
genesis of understanding itself, and these require explication. To be direct, significance is
the attachment of our being to other beings via sense-giving and language; and the forthe-sake-of-which denotes a living and fluid project-ing, the manipulation of our being-in
by dint of our projects and possibilities. This is all to say that what we are capable of
understanding hinges on meanings not only dependent on the totality of our worldedness,
but also the combined significance (i.e. import, weight) of our practical and concrete
projects and possibilities. Only at the intersections of what we care about and what makes
sense to us inside our cultural milieu can understanding be disclosed to us.

Ekstasis, Historicity, and Implications for Further Criticism
A final set of ideas bring to a close the circle of interpretation Heidegger has thus
far brought us into. To complicate the analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world that takescare-of, we must finally introduce time and historicity to the equation, an unspoken gap
which has not been given its due up until Division II of Being and Time. The particulars
of the structure of Dasein have prepared us to understand multiple features of humanbeing that usually get taken for granted: the fundamental essence of human existence, the
significant beings which make up our circles of reference and our worldedness, and our
understanding and attunement to this worldedness. Each of these are synchronic
structures connecting our various modes and capacities of being into a multiplicity, one
from which we compose all of our possible relations to the objects, places, people,

12

cultures, and environments we inhabit. But Heidegger will now enlarge his breakdown by
mixing in the dimension of time, or rather how we “swim”, so to speak, through the
aspects of time as something relevant to our practical relations. Ekstasis confirms the
temporal engagement Dasein is indistinguishable from, so much so that the forms of
being-in and taking-care-of are irrevocably revised to reflect the always already temporal
nature of our practical commitments as human beings. Simply put, Dasein is always eksistence, an existence that stands outside of itself in one of several ways: it can reveal
itself in modes of having-been, not-yet-being, or making-present. In this revelatory
breakthrough, Heidegger is uncovering the primordiality of human existence such as it
has been hitherto forgotten or concealed. By the same token, “Historicity” implies the
range of cultures and the objects within and consituted by them, and an authentic
historicity implements the understanding of ekstasis as outlined above: history would be
understood not merely as an academic discipline composed of experts and artifacts
worthy of study, but, alongside our ekstatic being, the fluidity of history moving through
the past, present, and future.
After such a round explication of terms, certain assumptions now set the stage for
the conflict of interpretations, as Paul Ricoeur has it, that will frame our reflections on
trauma, memory, family, and self. Heidegger’s understanding of human-being as
temporally existential, hermeneutic, and factically determined is paramount for all
cultural theory that succeeds him. Beyond this, however, his actual existential analytic
provides a bevy of rich terminology by which to re-examine the conditions Anzaldua is
subject to: something in Dasein’s ek-sistence is being re-interpreted by both her
predecessor’s generations and her own; worldedness and the circumspect understanding
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that accompanies it has been shaken to the core by the travails of exile, colonization, and
cultural trauma; and moodiness in terms of anxiety and something we could call
“historicity-retention”, the imprint of objects, memories, and places that have lost their
reference to the living root of the worldedness they once belonged to; that are carried
along tragically without the sense of place that begot them, solely within the memory of
those last lonely survivors of an age. How can an interpretation of self, not to mention
others, be compunded by the unavailability of linear foundations and essences, by a
dearth of cultural reference that haven’t been tainted by ontologically destructive
practices (e.g. colonization)? Correspondingly, we will now examine the complications
Jacques Derrida presents to selfhood, phenomenology, time, and writing, in his writings
on differance, the trace, and auto-affection.

Oneself as Temporal -- Differance and the Augenblick
In two shorter works, “Differance” and “Signs and the Blink of an Eye”, Derrida
makes interventions into interpretations of self, time, and phenomenology that will
further Heidegger’s insights and stand in juxtaposition to our subsequent readings in
trauma, testimony, and Anzaldua’s auto-theory.
First we have Derrida’s investigations into the nature of phenomenological
analysis in Speech and Phenomena, his reading of Husserl’s early attempts to ground a
proper and fully functional eidetic phenomenology. Derrida’s argument boils down to a
diagnosis of the perils of Husserl’s determinations, citing the realities of signification as
an insurmountable barrier to the kind of pure self knowledge Husserl is bowling for in his
own writings. To Derrida, Husserl is concerned with establishing a self-hood with
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absolute potential, the vehicle through which the discovery of essences in all intentional
acts becomes actuality. In order to accomplish this feat, much of the empirical realm must
be done away with, at least provisionally: “Self-presence must be produced in the
undivided unity of a temporal present so as to have nothing to reveal to itself by the
agency of signs” (Speech and Phenomena, 60) As Derrida points out, part and parcel of
this reduction to a pure “seeing” is an elision of all signification and language -- a
practical impossibility. Not only this, but a certain logocentric 7 bias, “a certain concept of
the ‘now,’ of the present as punctuality of the instant, discretely but decisively sanctions
the whole system of ‘essential distinctions.’” (61) This penchant for presence is a scab in
the history of western philosophy Derrida will do his utmost to pick at, gnawing into its
ramifications in all facets of discourse.
And it is this same tendency that stalks Husserl’s interventions into studies on
temporality in his “Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness”. Derrida’s
contention is that this metaphysics finds a new home in a philosophy of consciousness,
specifically self-consciousness and its representation to itself. Somewhere along the line,
this manner of thinking which is nothing more than arbitrary and historically designated,
seized a hegemony for itself, and gradually slipped into our conceptions of self and
world: our notions of time became saturated with the present, as it indicated “a
nondisplaceable center, an eye or living core, the punctuality of the real now.” (62) And
this logocentrism now re-emerges in Husserl’s trials for a pure phenomenological

The centering and privileging of “presence”,as opposed to “absence”, in metaphysical thought. What
makes it ensnaring is its subtlety, and its conflation with truth itself, as Derrida describes: “Within
philosophy there is no possible objection concerning this privilege of the present-now; it defines the very
element of philosophical thought, it is evidence itself, conscious thought itself, it governs every possible
concept of truth and sense.” (62)
7
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method, one requiring a “solitary mental life” devoid of signification and outside of time
for the completion of his reductions and the achievement of the analysis of pure essences.
A commendable goal indeed. Derrida does not leave much room for it, however,
as he points out in typically deconstructive fashion how Husserl’s formulation necessarily
implicates an otherness -- namely, time and absence -- in any definition for the fully
present moment. It becomes apparent that “The presence of the perceived present can
appear as such only inasmuch as it is continuously compounded with a nonpresence and
nonperception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention).” (64) If
Husserl covets a perfect moment, one purified of all worldly and incarnate imperfections,
then ideality will have to wait… literally. Time, memory, and otherness suffuse the
stream of our conscious experience, and in fact render conscious/unconscious binaries at
once more feasible and more doubtful8. At the same time, the ideal godhood of an
unblemished and self-assured method and perspective are quashed, or stalled sufficiently
to obviate a particular sect of opinions and common sense conclusions. Representation
(or Vorstellung, in the German philosophical tradition) is once again a battleground for
competing points of view, ones not only mediated by discourse and language a la the
premises of Cultural Studies9; but also,now, temporality and memory in the creation of
one’s identity.

Derrida pays due heed to the implications of these conclusions with how they interact with Freud’s
psychic theories: “It is no accident that The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness [sic] both
confirms the dominance of the present and rejects the ‘after-event’ of the becoming conscious of an
‘unconscious content’ which is the structure of temporality implied throughout Freud’s texts.
8

9

See Hall, Stuart, “Cultural Identity and Diaspora”
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In another famous essay, “Differance”, Derrida evokes two similarly productive
non-concepts: that of “play”, and the eponymous “differance” otherwise characterized as
“arche-writing”. “Differance” and the “trace” are unspeakable words, unthinkable
concepts, and anti-ontological philosophies. Derrida will repeatedly belabor the point of
the notion’s instability and anti-authority, and the need to think in a fashion radically
different from tendencies towards mastery, autocracy, singularity, and control. He
therefore approaches any and all descriptions towards understanding the term with
caution, and a rigor that could be mistaken for bewildering indirectness or tomfoolery. If
language, as Ferdinand de Saussure posits, is a system that precedes individual speech
acts; that constitutes meaning not by independent positive significations, but through
difference and the structural integrity of the system as a whole; that sustains this web of
differentiation across present instantiations (synchronically) and across history
(diachronically); and finds the sign, broken into signifier and signified, to be not a tough
lump of connective tissue but a pliant and separable linking that is provisional through
and through. These conclusions combine with Derrida’s meticulous readings of Husserl
and phenomenology to bring him to a startling discovery: meaning, according to
Saussure’s own premises, cannot be settled or bounded into a fixed locale. It cannot be
completed in a single sign, being that difference and arbitrary connections belie that
possibility; it cannot be recounted in a single utterance, as that meaning relies on
countless as yet unsaid and unverbalized utterances, not to mention the innumerable
histories that came before it; it cannot be found in the system at large, because the system
itself is in flux and too global to be reduced to a particular assertion or objectification;
and it cannot be outsourced to metaphysics, philosophy, religion, or other variations on
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transcendental signifiers because these themselves are mere facets of signifying practices,
and who moreover represent logocentric ontologies that contradict and even erase
difference and deferral as conditions for life, existence, be-ing to be possible.
As for the term itself, differance points to, implies, and suggests the character of
signifying acts and our temporal being through a performative gesture: enacting the
quandary that broaches all of the aforementioned realizations in a single letter, the “a” in
“differance”. Derrida relates how the word is practically unrepresentable in French
speech, the “a” and “e” scarcely distinguishable to most listeners; this present/absent
distinction stands for the “trace”, the evanescent flow of meaning between signs and sign
systems. The modification also references the fact that writing, the byword for lack of
presence and the voice, actually turns out to be better at conveying the difference.
Finally, a duality of difference/deferral is alluded to, one that spotlights a critical factor of
the theory of meaning:
In constituting itself, in dividing itself dynamically, this interval is what might be
called spacing, the becoming-space of time or the becoming-time of space
(temporization). And it is this constitution of the present, as an ‘originary’ and
irreducibly nonsimple… synthesis of marks… that I propose to call archiwriting, archi-trace, or differance. (Margins of Philosophy, 13)

Derrida here connects the spacing that becomes visible on the page, the negative space
and allegedly non-signifying articles and punctuation, with a theory of signification,
claiming that it is precisely these absences of meaning that must obtain if any meaning is
to exist at all. He is pointing to how meaning is neither the presence of pure signs nor the
absence of nothingness, but a trace that proceeds indefinitely and sans eradication, that
always prevails and that makes our languages exactly what they are. He alludes to a
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cross-contamination, an interbreeding of time qua space and space qua time as another
instance of our ontologies failing to make sense of the complex phenomena that
undergird our very existences: language makes meaning via difference, a spacing going
on between signs; but at one and the same time, meaning is being generated by deferral,
by the time-lag necessary for one sign to not be crossed up by another. And both of these
movements must take place, so much so that they can become inseparable in our
conceptions, beyond the binary that concealed their wonder and unfathomability.
When it comes time to outline “play”, Derrida makes reference to just these
aspects of “differance” that constitute the movement or refraction of meanings that
protract delivery, that forestall conclusions and closure with a flickering of signification
in between and among positive terms rather than inherent and whole in any single one of
them. He specifies two qualities of “play” in particular, the strategic and the adventurous:
In the delineation of differance everything is strategic and adventurous. Strategic
because no transcendent truth present outside the field of writing can govern
theologically the totality of the field. Adventurous because this strategy is not a
simple strategy in the sense that strategy orients tactics according to a final goal, a
telos or theme of domination, a mastery and ultimate reappropriation of the
development of the field. (7)

Without transcendent signification nor the teleological guidance-hegemony it entails,
“play” or “playfulness” involves reading and interpretation as matters of discovery, of
chance and blind fate, of entropic madcap foolery or jest, all because there is no higher
order with the final say or dictate to govern over us by. While the coltish ramifications of
such a decision might be the most apparent, the socio-political consequences for a
determination of self/collective identity are just as stark: no matter what transcendental
signifiers we might lean on (God, Country, Family, Law) the fact of the matter is all
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identity formations will trek through morasses of ambiguity and nothingness over which
their signifiers will endeavor to create meaning. And the point, if there is one, is that the
nature of this stumbling is evolutionary, flexible and non-static, and that the
adventurousness and playfulness always already rejects teleology and transcendental
origins. Thus the creation of identity, porous and fluid as it is, means that it is through
gaps and spaces that meaning is created, and that new ontologies of self and community
are born.
So if the self is not whole in any present moment, it is because its process in time,
as an inhabiting of time, constructs its edifice, or paints its portrait. While seemingly selfevident, common sense conclusions and readings of various phenomena still persist in
privileging the present moment, the Augenblick, in representations of the self to itself: it
will become apparent in conflicted readings in psychoanalysis and trauma theory, and
perhaps be reborn in a religio-metaphysical commemoration in the auto-theory of Gloria
Anzaldua, a re-writing of the self always already in progress but in tribute to its cultural
memory. Where Derrida leaves off and Anzaldua begins is in the praxis of this recreation,
the application of writing as chisel to the marble of the self, elevating play to an affective
and emotionally poignant crescendo, and paralleling the spiritual as an embodied and
practical engagement with worldedness that expands meaning into a dialectic between
oneself and one’s Lebenswelt. It is in her return to cultural memory and religiometaphysical roots that Anzaldua grounds her being and her traumas in a collective past,
while still allowing for an embrace of an openly mestiza future.
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Trauma Studies and Psychoanalysis
With our presuppositions about temporality, selfhood, and worldedness set up and
buttressed, we continue on to the foundational premises of literary trauma theory.
Immediately capturing our attention is the work of Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, and
Dori Laub, all of whom are accredited with inaugurating the discipline of trauma studies
in the United States. All of these thinkers share a view that is decidedly more poststructuralist in sympathy than a discourse arguing for and articulating concepts in the
literature of trauma would apparently warrant at first sight. In fact, all of these thinkers
owe at least the lion's share of their insights and foundational assumptions to the work of
Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Jacques Derrida. As we have already unpacked the
significance of Derrida with respect to temporality and the self, an inquiry into
psychoanalysis via Freud will open an adjancent field of analysis; questions on the nature
of traumatic memory and recall, of the objects represented in the dark hollows of
individual psyches, of the affective responses characterizing a painful recollection, and of
the repetition (or otherwise resolution of) the referent experiences and their
correspondent hang-ups.
The psychoanalytic contribution to literary trauma studies is reducible (for our
purposes) to a few notable examples and their subsequent reinterpretation by the
inaugural generation of self-styled trauma scholars. Freud's most influential and resonant
conceptual advances came in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1961, Strachey), the book
which Cathy Caruth would later take up as one of the foundational texts in trauma theory.
Freud comes to the question in the wake of numerous patients, all recent veterans of the
first World War, appearing with new symptoms and neuroses: flashbacks, anxiety,
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nightmares, insomnia. Freud identifies these as "war neuroses", a condition subsidiary to
the more generalized "traumatic neuroses", attributed to victims of life in the trenches on
the Western Front. His intention in writing Beyond the Pleasure Principle is revisionary,
to make the facts of traumatic symptoms in veterans square with his theory of dreams, to
wit the recurrent nightmares of a patient reliving their instance of traumatization with
what he had repeatedly referred to as the "pleasure principle" operating in all conscious
states. To Freud, human psyches retained their state of equanimity as one that was
immanently pleasurable, a constancy they would always strive to return to. Pulling in the
other direction, however, is an equally constant and potent excitation from the external
world, much of which the ego cannot withstand and is always teetering on the brink of
being overrun with. Mental events are "invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable
tension, [] that [] takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of
that tension — that is, with an avoidance of or a production of pleasure." (Freud, 3) It is
this regulation back to the norm or the mean that defines the "pleasure principle" — and
its temporizing correlate, the "reality principle", a rule permitting a deferment of the
ultimate pleasure for a short period. But it is the "repetition compulsion" Freud observes
in his patient's waking activities and nightmares which disturbs the neatness of his initial
reading, and is what compels him to reconfigure his theory to make room for
significantly more difference. The "death drive" is this postulated factor, the one which
upsets solely positive interpretations of the human psyche and introduces a psychic drive
intent on disruption, and disassociation, from the conscious ego; the unconscious, as it
turns out, contains instincts directed by both pleasure and self-annihilation.
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Later, and in a quaint analogy, Freud compares the threshold of consciousness and
the external world as a membrane to those found in single-celled organisms. The
membrane’s threshold comprises the perceptual consciousness, the outer shell of the
human psyche responsible for perception. But that isn't the whole story, as "Protection
against stimuli is an almost more important function for the living organism than
reception of stimuli" (emphasis original, 30). As the outer frontier of psychic systems —
and furthermore one equally regulated by the pleasure principle — the whole structure of
conscious thought has, invested in its very topography, an interest in preserving a
balanced state of pleasure/unpleasure, with excitations borne in from the outside world
being a prominent source for the latter. And this is precisely the site where traumatic
experience occurs: Freud speculates that those experiences which we could designate as
traumatic are caused by "any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to
break through the protective shield." (Freud, 33) These breaches have only one possible
response, in his mind, which begins immediately following the interpolating attack. The
psyche endeavors in "mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of
binding them, in the psychical sense, so that they can then be disposed of." (33-4) The
whole problem as Freud sees it lies in a low cathexis (a system underinvested with
libidinal energies) at the breached site, rendering the subject vulnerable to what he refers
to as "fright", the characteristic response of surprise and unpreparedness.
Understood in concert and in context, the pieces of the puzzle now begin to fall
into place. Freud now has the tools to explain the nature of traumatic nightmares, and
their place in his system: they are repetitive attempts to "master the stimullus
retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic
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neurosis." (Freud, 37) These dreams are not functions of wish-fulfillment and the
pleasure principle, therefore, but rather more promordial and fundamental re-structurings
of the psychical architecture on the level of the integrity of the ego as such, a
reconfiguration of cathexes following a dramatic and damaging oversight in the psyche's
distribution. The repetitive character of traumatic nightmares is the performance of such
restructuring, and the anxiety they produce is, with respect to the fabrication of a new
ego, the "intended" outcome of preconscious processes and the dream-work.
Unpacking Freud's propositions in Beyond the Pleasure Principle makes for a
thought-provoking and needle-moving entrance to an entire discipline (psychoanalysis).
But the conceptual deluge calls for something of a step-back, a bigger-picture survey of
the field as it currently stands in reference to critical controversies and the field of literary
studies as a whole. Trauma studies, in its original iteration, is a product of a small coterie
of American literary scholars convening out of a complex of shared concerns. Cathy
Caruth, Shoshana Felman, Dori Laub, and Geoffrey Hartmann are cited by Stef Craps
and Lucy Bond in their monograph Trauma (2019) as founding members of a resurgence
of interest in the topic. All of these theorists (with the exception of Laub, a practicing
psychotherapist) were members of the so-called Yale School of Criticism, specializing in
an Americanized brand of deconstructive readings inspired by Jacques Derrida. By Bond
and Craps's estimation, the Yale literary trio became interested in trauma as part of "an
effort to redeem and rehabilitate a mode of criticism that had fallen out of favor" and "the
reinvention in an ethical guise of an embattled paradigm" (Bond & Craps, 52). There is a
grain of truth to their sideswipes at the legacy of deconstructive literary theory and
criticism, and its worst abuses as an ahistorical doctrine flimsy in its resolutions against
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fascistic tendencies even among its adherents. But what deconstruction does bring to the
table is in Derrida's rigorous critiques of logocentrism, binaristic thinking, and the
presence of self and meaning, the utility of which extends into the reading of literary texts
and beyond.
And the Yale critics were more than keen to pick up on the trails left behind in
Derrida's wake. The ethical turn in literary studies characteristic of the mid 1990s
appertained most viscerally for trauma studies in the way that it copes with the legacy of
the Holocaust and its victims/survivors. Most of the enduring polemics endemic to
literary trauma studies spring from questions related to managing the memory of what
struck the Jewish people in Europe during the 20th century: What becomes history, and
who gets to decide? How can we adequately and conscientiously represent an atrocity so
far in the distant extremes of enormity? How, indeed, to make comprehensible something
so incomprehensible to an age of scientific progress, (relative) economic prosperity, and
the highest advances of “Reason”? What can art hope to stand for when cowed by such
senselessness? And what about those who felt the corporal punishment, where directly
disciplined, coerced, confined, brutalized, and finally murdered by the abbatoir that was
the Nazi regime? What is the nature and borders of traumatic experience according to the
travails of those who survived this onslaught? And how ought those listening to their
testimonies bear appropriate witness? Should the survivors themselves be dwelling
responsibly in past anguishes, or surpassing them?
It is from this monumental catastrophe of the 20th century that the field by and
large sources its raison d’etre. The two vectors worth plumbing — the moment of
traumatization, and the testimony and bearing witness that circumscribe it — are each
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explored in their distinct ramifications by, respectively, Cathy Caruth and the pairing of
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub. Caruth’s approach is both more literary (i.e. more
fundamentally applicable to our primary texts) and more directly affiliated with the
intersection of psychoanalysis and deconstruction thus far explored in this paper, and so
will be treated first. Felman and Laub, as well as numerous secondary or minor figures in
the fields of Trauma, Memory, and Holocaust studies, will figure more as supporting
theory due to the comparative limits of these fields to the subject matter of this thesis.
Cathy Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience is a landmark work in trauma studies, its
publication representing the induction of many precepts or guiding questions/concerns
the field now takes for granted. As already mentioned, Caruth’s worldview incorporates
deconstructive traits into a psychoanalytic reading of traumatic representation,
experience, and recall, homing in on the distinct problematic of the uncertain and the
unknown coextensive with the acts of wounding and being wounded by our pasts. These
notions all stem from the analyses Freud produces in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with
certain salient differences. For one, Caruth is less concerned with restricting her
interpretation solely to the instances of repetition. Where Freud sees the re-enactment,
over and over again, of the conditions inducing the traumatic neurosis in order that they
may be superseded, Caruth also discovers an ethical component, an intersubjective
imperative contained within the repetition compulsion that holds within it the
fountainhead of witnessing and ethics themselves. The figurative trope she makes use of
is the “speaking wound”, an image which points out the dilated response and corpotemporal division between the knowing and not knowing attendant to those whom have
been breached by a traumatic experience.

26

Caruth agrees with Freud that trauma is brought on by a sudden influx of intrusive
stimuli; their difference lies in the subject’s response to this moment of crisis. As we have
seen, Freud’s position seeks to explain anxiety, repetition, and nightmares, leading him to
postulate a death drive manifesting as a compulsion to repeat self-destructive behaviors.
Caruth is, as we have outlined, of the camp favoring an intersubjective reading of Freud:
she sees the trauma as fundamentally about relation with another, a matter irreducible to
just the inner psyche. It is because the wounding is caused by trauma, by the surprise
“accident”, that it catches the subject unawares and does not become “available” to
consciousness until it sprouts up in dreams and neuroses. (Unclaimed Experience [UE],
4). In much the same way as the originary moment of transcendental knowledge becomes
elusive to Husserl as Derrida reads him, and the kernel of human nature escapes the grasp
of the history of western philosophy, so too is the traumatic experience never quite
incorporated by the survivor: “...Trauma is not locatable in the simple violent or original
event in an individual’s past, but rather in the way that its very unassimilated nature -- the
way it was precisely not known in the first instance -- returns to haunt the survivor later
on.” (UE, 4) Caruth highlights the impossibility of the survivor’s absolute and transparent
knowledge of the event they return to again and again — as it is exactly for this reason
that their fixation on the moment occupies their dreams and nightmares. Her reading has
it that the relation from survivor and event is not one-to-one, never a direct reference but
one interpolated by the dilation of temporality. Caruth would designate this stretching of
time in traumatic remembrance “latency”, describing how “the experience of trauma. . .
would thus seem to consist, not in the forgetting of a reality that can hence never be fully
known, but in an inherent latency within the experience itself.” (UE, 18) Caruth is
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making a point not dissimilar to the one Derrida makes in Speech and Phenomena: the
experience of oneself is, structurally speaking, not identical to the originary moment of
consciousness, but displaced in time and space as a flow away from that origin. But while
Derrida is arguing for the primordiality of this experience, Caruth differentiates the
traumatic moment as one that brings to a halt part of the temporalizing process of beinghuman/Dasein, that retains the pastness of a bygone event in making-present in a fashion
disruptive to linearity in personal histories. In much the same way, the argument’s
conclusion disposes with pure representation of self to oneself, or of self to other,
replacing purity with contingency, uncertainty, and dispersion.
As directness is absent from the survivor’s own full knowledge of themselves and
their experience, then the witness cannot hope to know it in any fuller sense than the
bearer of that burden already does. But listening is not out of the question; indeed, it is
more vital than ever. Relation is transfigured into that of the “speaking wound”, the
histories of self and other contained within trauma’s echoes that reveal identity, history,
narrative, past. And all this concealed, veiled over, in a survivor’s testimony, itself
necessarily more akin to literature and poetic language than literal representation.
Understanding trauma is not then simply a matter of pathology or curable disease: the
wound speaks to us, tries to address us “in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is
not otherwise available.” (UE, 4) Acts, intentions, language, and signification stemming
from a traumatic event thus represent the unknown and unknowable to ourselves and
others, and these show up in the most mundane and routine acts, or in our darkest
moments.
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Caruth’s demonstrations echo her sentiments; they have the ominous aura of the
intensely unknown. Faithful to ethical implications in the poststructuralist tradition as
announced by Levinas and then expanded by Derrida, Caruth points out the aporetics
native to trauma: the wound’s primordial cry towards an imperative, despite its obscurity;
its displacement into the external and other, even while it overflows its borders into every
part of the survivor’s lived experience; and perhaps most markedly, in the very structure
of its (non)occurence, of how trauma consists in “a repeated suffering of the event, but it
is also a continual leaving of its site.” (Trauma: Explorations in Memory [TEM], 10)
Taking account of these disparities and the uncertainty rife in any enterprise set on
making sense of the senseless becomes paramount. If traumatic testimony addresses both
what is consciously spoken and unconsciously transmitted, then only a reading practice
sensitive to the contradictions wrought when individual and collective, remembered and
forgotten, repeated and revised lose themselves in their counterpart. The condition is shot
through with paradox, so its solutions must embrace the same if they are to speak the
same language.
Missing from this account, however, is a praxis of self: Caruth’s theorems are,
phenomenologically speaking, not undertaken as one subjected directly to the trauma in
itself. While a fair portion of her innovation is in deconstructing the full logos of the
traumatic event in the survivor’s pysche and dispersing its meaning into relation and
otherness, the privileged locus of testimony has not changed. It is thus a fair and
necessary criticism to suggest that Caruth is discussing more of a structural condition of
traumatic narratives, experience, and healing, than propounding the concrete particulars
of what actual resolution and convalescence would look like. Her position is indeed vital
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for reception of testimony, but she falls short when it comes to therapeutic or healing
practices. An interesting fact, as her reading and interpretive strategy still lends itself to
understanding the first-person and descriptive procedures of as Anzaldua will take it up.
Caruth favors a more narratological and experiential rendering of the lived particulars of
trauma than an orthodox psychoanalytic or psychiatric perspective: “Rather than
straightforwardly describing actual case studies of trauma survivors or attempting to
elucidate directly the psychiatry of trauma,” she clarifies, “the chapters that follow
explore the complex ways that knowing and not knowing are entangled in the language
of trauma and in the stories associated with it.” (emphasis mine, Caruth, 4) Fittingly,
Caruth is preoccupied not with breaking down the structures of traumatic experience into
scientific codes, but with resisting such an impulse to knowledge while underlining the
specificity and unassimilability of both the experience for the survivor and their
testimony for the witness. To this end, she sets out to explore the language and narratives
surrounding these experiences from a concretely first-hand perspective — that of her
bearing witness as interpreter to the examples she picks out of literature, film, and theory.
All of this is to suggest two conclusions: that Caruth’s methods and ends are more
markedly phenomenological and deconstructive with their eye towards lived experience,
phenomena over conceptual coagulation, and the ethics of bearing witness than perhaps
they are purely psychoanalytic; and that a theory of trauma elucidated by the victim
themselves could perform the dual function of relating the unclaimed experience (and
thereby claiming it) and simultaneously moving towards resolution within this act of
bearing witness to their own unrecognized past, while simultaneously proposing their
testimony to be corroborated by another. The clash of both imperatives — to listen
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attentively and cautiously; to reconstruct narratives for one's own purposes — is the
painful, mournful, rending act that phenomenology and psychoanalysis wrestle with, and
that Anzaldua recreates in her onto-spiritual self-rendering styled as the "Coyolxauhqui
Imperative", a queer deconstructing of what could be read as a false binary of
listening/speaking. This species of theorizing — what we might call “auto-theory” — is
precisely what my readings of Gloria Anzaldua’s work will come into contact with, and
will endeavor to develop as a previously under-interpreted aspect of Anzaldua’s thought
as an effort to literally inscribe the darkest of demons into one self.
There must always be undiscovered abodes of memory, history, being, and a
pattern of traumatic experience and recall is no different. Caruth, paraphrasing Lenore
Terr, herself proffers the idea that “there may not be one simple, generalizable set of rules
that can determine in advance the truth of any particular case, and we may thus ultimately
have to struggle with the particularity of each individual story in order to learn anew,
each time, what it means for a memory to be true.” (TEM, viii-ix) This same struggle
transfers itself, moving beyond a concern for the self in traumatic survivors and toward,
as implied by Caruth’s proposition, a prerequisite for a conscientious witnessing writ
large. Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub will answer the call for such a form, and in the
process lay the foundations for a healthy respect of difference — in race, class, gender,
and so on — in trauma theory as a field.

A Crisis in Witnessing
Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub’s seminal Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in
Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History revitalizes an important and hitherto underserved
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side of the ideas explored in this thesis: what does the process of listening-to,
interpreting, receiving, reconciling, and accepting the personal stories of one’s loved ones
look like? What are the cracks in the methodological pavement to be avoided, and where
reside the dead-ends which lead the listener only to regressions in understanding the
speaker’s testimony? And what is the role of — or the centrality or the marginality of —
factuality, history, and truth vis-a-vis affect, interpretation, faith, and trauma when it
comes to performing the act of witnessing?
Felman opens the problematic with a few key concerns: what is testimony as it
relates to culture, memory, history, truth, affect, and trauma? Any answer to this set of
questions must, to her, begin with a wonderment embedded alongside an uncertainty, an
openness towards difference and the unknown: “This is a book on memory and on
questions. On questions that we do not know, that we do not as yet possess as questions,
but which nonetheless compellingly address us from within contemporary art and from
within contemporary history.” (Felman & Laub, xiii) Jointly with Caruth, Felman extols
the virtues of literature and its powers to contain the testimony of a pain, a wound, that
resonates with an ethical imperative. She and Laub further this idea by adding their
reflections on the ways that not only a listener must treat and embrace the act of bearing
witness, but how the very conditions of testimony are problematized.
Felman’s chapter Education and Crisis, Or the Vicissitudes of Teaching,
documents the process and renewed understanding she underwent during a graduate
seminar she taught at Yale. Her aim? To demonstrate the ubiquity of testimony in all
genres of writing, while coaxing out an understanding of the encounter with strangeness
that thinking about testimony proposes to a wider readership. Upon closer inspection, it is
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the vitality of that uncanniness that inspires the witness to their listening, and the writer
or speaker to their expression. There is something about this relation, Felman argues, that
resembles a “trial”, at which one or another — writer, artist, poet, survivor — is
“appointed” to speak their part at the witness stand, to pass on the details and minutiae of
their experience in order to record this horror, this perturbation of our reason we call
existence (Felman & Laub, 2). The most effective manifestations have the distinct and
unusual property of imbuing themselves in their totality into their listener, their reader,
their witness. Felman refers to these as “life testimonies,” something that is “not simply a
testimony to a private life, but a point of conflation between text and life, a textual
testimony which can penetrate us like an actual life.” (emphasis original, 2) In other
words, the signifier that is the text has so approximated, so integrated itself into its
signified (the lived experience, the author, the meaning) that for all appearances the
reader/listener receives the embodiment of that life through the text. While
poststructuralist criticism has already apprised us of the significant and unbridgeable
chasms lining the transmission of meaning in speech, writing, and language, the powerful
experiences Felman describes stand apart; As Derrida explains, it is exactly the
impossibility of exact relation that compels the exhortation to bear witness, to have faith,
to inaugurate the ethical.
Another way to note the same idea is through the discernible connection between
the individual and the collective, one of several contradictions spanning the condition.
The Appointment (what makes one a witness?) is how Felman arranges and frames this
double bind: one is compelled to speak out of a duty, out of an imperative to report on
crimes or traumas no one else is available or capable of speaking to. It is a “solitary
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burden” (3), yet one the witness is simultaneously impelled to break out from, reaching
out to others who would listen. These ethical conclusions sprout from a historical
moment, one that seems to have morphed into a hotbed of testimonial literature with the
tide of the mid-20th century catastrophes of the two World Wars. Felman terms this a
“crisis of truth”, comparing the larger predicament to one faced in the everyday setting of
a courtroom, one where witnesses are routinely brought to the stand when all other
evidence-gathering methods have failed. The resonances for our purposes are clear: what
is the role of the speaker, the one charged with transforming the unspeakable into
something to be channelled to others waiting to listen? What does the act of testifying
mean for the witness, and what does it mean to those just as impossibly burdened with
setting the stage for them to bear out this testifying?
Returning to the psychoanalytic model brings to light some of the qualities
immanent to this office, specifically in the context of the knowledge of self through
memory, time, and trauma we’ve already reviewed. Felman highlights precisely the
dialogical schematic in psychoanalytic discourse — and, more importantly, its clinical
practice — which facilitates the discovery and understanding of previously untrodden
regions of oneself. This dialogue has revolutionary potential, as she points out: it is,
fundamentally speaking, the revelation of unconscious testimony and the process
unveiled by the analyst, one in which "the doctor's testimony does not substitute itself for
the patient's testimony, but resonates with it." (15) These conclusions are in line with
findings so far evident from Caruth, Derrida, and Heidegger: the self, unwound across
time, and its dearth of simple resolution with itself in any nugget of momentary and
divine clarity. After all, Freud (as Felman reminds us) always believed in the fact that "it
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takes two to witness the unconscious" (emphasis original, 15) and part and parcel to a
rethinking of testimony is a rethinking of ontology, of seeing human-being as incomplete
and in progress, neither a plenitude nor a self-sufficient nucleus. Implications from such a
basic restructuring are always far-reaching, a domino-effect:
that one does not have to possess or own the truth, in order to effectively
bear witness to it; that speech as such is unwittingly testimonial; and that
the speaking subject constantly bears witness to a truth that nonetheless
continues to escape him, a truth that is, essentially, not available to its own
speaker. (15)
What we learn at last is in the relational and ethical claims to self-knowledge, and its
links to speaking, writing, and interchangeability with others via testimony. These are
confirmations and extensions of time, history, and its ruptures as we have thus far
examined them, and yet also incorporating personal and individual affective responses to
the wider historical threads and contexts they are encountered in. A self unburdened from
transhistorical essences is similarly disabused of requirements for transhistorical truth; or,
to put it another way, once the witness to trauma (and the witness to this witness) shed
the onerous strictures of historical consistency and fact, the way is open for a closer
listening to the scars laid upon the bodies and texts (and bodies-as-texts) each witness
represents, and to a historiography less dismissive and more appreciative of subjective
testimonials and their truths.
Dori Laub brings expertise in clinical psychiatry and psychoanalysis that
complements the literary and narrative theorizing Felman conducts for her part. He walks
a fine line, theorizing a clinician’s perspective on traumatic life experiences and the road
to recovery, without overly pathologizing and while abstaining from retaliatory judgment.
His is an approach, therefore, laudable for its ethical commitment, something more
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common and more easily imaginable from someone who has either personally or at a
single remove dealt with similar events to what they are treating their patients for. Laub’s
contributions echo and further Felman’s, in particular the description of testimony as a
procedural form of knowing, a creative act inscrutable to its speaker until it is spoken.
His inferral from this premise is about the equally vital role of a listener, a witness to the
event of emergence without which the act remains unheard, and therefore unmotivated to
be spoken in the first place. He asserts that "the testimony to the trauma thus includes its
hearer, who is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the event comes to be inscribed for
the first time.” (57) So testimony can only operate in its healing, redemptive capacity if a
place exists for its reception — a reception meaning an acute and sensitive listener.
The fact of the request for a listener, moreover, as opposed to an "objective"
space attests to the humanism of the problem. Matters of objective fact and record are not
at issue, but the very felt and incarnated record the witness provides, the subjective truths
and, more importantly for our purposes, worlded historicity they carry that is our concern.
Laub sketches out an anecdote of a Holocaust survivor's testimony about an uprising at
Auschwitz, and its skewering for historical innacuracies by scholars at a conference.
While busy sniffing out errors and discrepancies in her testimony, the scholars were
missing a crucial fact of their own: the survivor was telling the story not of exactly what
happened, but of how the prisoners felt and what the uprising meant to them. Reading for
the concrete expressions of trauma and memory through affect and meaning has a
categorically different end in mind, one that privileges the survivor and human being as
the locus of history and recovery.
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If what pertains to our study is complexly subjective rather than purely objective,
then the observer must announce and process their own subjectivity in relation to it.
There is no longer any impartial standing, any dispassionate position, to conceive of. If
truth hinges on the fragile expressivity of a survivor and the tandem embrace of a listener,
the stakes become much higher — not least of all for the listener themselves. The second
witness to the event, and the conduit through which the victim pours their story, are in a
real sense party to the anguish of the survivor, feeling “the bewilderment, injury,
confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma victim feels.” (58). When woefully
undertrained or even unaware of the impacts inherent to the role, listeners (whether social
workers, psychiatrists, or loved ones) subject themselves to the marginal after-effects of
their traumatized counterparts, like looking too closely at the sun.
In order to stave off this type of secondary traumatization, “The listener, therefore, has to
be at the same time a witness to the trauma witness and a witness to himself.” (58) Laub’s
observation opens a path to a proper account of traumatic breaks and their remedies as
surpassing the borders of any one individual, and incorporates a notion not only of selfreflexivity but of expressivity.
And the extension of these borders bears out in the spread of catastrophe, a
lingering complex of micro and macro inflictions and re-inflictions of pain attendant to
the original moment. Laub outlines cases in which, for example, a survivor has gone on
to repeat or otherwise suffer a copy of the trauma in their later lives by virtue of the
memory’s suppression over a long period of time. Laub’s pictures of patients that have
lost homes, careers, and even their entire families in the decades subsequent to the event
demonstrates “The continued power of the silenced memory”, and how it “finds its way
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into [his patient’s] lives, unwittingly, through an uncanny repetition of events that
duplicate — in structure and in impact — the traumatic past.” (65) The very compression
of the memory within brings about violent internal stirrings, an upsetting of vitality from
the inside out with aftershocks emanating — in another demonstration of their extent —
to the survivors children and even grandchildren. He describes the metaphor of a “black
hole” in memory, a structure of denial and nihility at the center of where most children
seek the memories of their parent’s childhoods and upbringing to be bequeathed to them
as part of understanding their personal histories. In survivors of extreme trauma, the
silence — whether mute or displaced in glib distractions — becomes a new source of
pain, one where the children must struggle to fathom their origins in order to recollect the
futures disguised within them. This recovery is virtually a matter of life and death for the
second generation, for which the structure of memory itself is at pains of collapse so long
as their predecessors keep the deep recesses of the past in a straightjacket. It is therefore
why Laub considers the “the place of the greatest density of silence” the same one which
“paradoxically becomes, for those children of survivors, the only place which can provide
an access to the life that existed before their birth.” (64-5) If resolution is viable, or even
possible, it will reside in the twisted knot at the heart of every subsequent upset, pang,
and multiplying wound that continues its scarring effect. And the lives touched by the
fringes of this wound will feel the inverse imperative, to dive headlong into their
patrimonial traumas and clear the way for a renewal of memory and history.
As has become evident then, the act of witnessing encompasses more than the
lonely self and sufferer of the traumatic memory, and bears trenchant repercussions for
those unwitting participants to its hurt. What, then, would a possible recovery consist of?
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Some jeopardy lies in wait for those less wary of where such an endeavor can go awry.
As we have seen, all hangs on the quality of listener. What comes next depends on
circumstances, but a potentially disastrous result betokens the larger risks of bearing
witness: the recurrence of traumatization. A miscarriage of either the telling, where “the
price of speaking is re-living” (67), or in the listening, where “the absence of an
addressable other, an other who can hear the anguish of one’s memories and thus affirm
and recognize their realness, annihilates the story” (68) both conclude with a mere
repetition, if not downright exacerbation, of traumatic anguish. What constitutes the
correct approach in such a situation? Returning to the fundamentals of the traumatization
process provides some clues, while preventing any straightforward answers to the
difficulties we’ve so far enumerated.
The cross-pollination of ideas between Laub, Felman, and Caruth is manifest here
once more, as Laub circumscribes the structure of trauma as something taking place
“outside the parameters of ‘normal’ reality”, making it “an event that has no beginning,
no ending, no before, no during, and no after.” (69) Here is a differently nuanced position
from Caruth’s, for whom the traumatic event is fundamentally mis-experienced and
forever lost to conscious perception, to be recalled indefinitely and without resolution.
Laub differs slightly in opinion in his determination that the traumatic is utterly without
reference, devoid of comprehension, and beyond the scope of everyday language. But his
true distinction is in articulating a methodology, a plan of escape, for the turmoil of such
apparently perpetual internal strife. In what he terms “re-externalizating [sic] the event”,
an exit by way of compromise is proposed, a light at the end of the tunnel for survivors
involving the grueling act of re-telling in order to exorcise the memory. In projecting the
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past out into the world, a return to communal time is effected for the victim’s inner
bounds, “a reassertion of the hegemony of reality and a re-externalization of the evil that
affected and contaminated the trauma victim.” (69). The texts of trauma, therefore, can be
read as efforts of testimony or of bearing witness, as they are in principle the
manifestations of self-remedy.
While Laub is referncing traumas native to an existentially apocalyptic event,
some of his insights are still transferable to structures and happenings less extreme, albeit
still shocking, to their victims. We can take this position without too much constraint if
we consider the larger view of their project as propounded by Felman in the book’s
preface. Their actual interest, broadly speaking, is in “the meeting point between violence
and culture, the very moment when, precisely, the phenomenon of violence and the
phenomenon of culture come to clash — and yet to mingle — in contemporary history.”
(xiii) The downstream effects of violence on culture, interpersonally and at the familial
and society-wide levels, has wider ramifications and applicability. Still, Caruth’s words
loom large: there are as many ways of treating a traumatic memory as there are traumatic
memories. Our methodology ought to be adaptive to this fact, less of a rigid structure
which risks displacing the traumatic narrative and causing active violence to the testifier
in the form of re-traumatization. Laub would agree — and he points to the instances of
re-traumatization associated with the failure of the witness to furnish a kind, attentive,
and composed act of listening, which includes cultural sensitivity and awareness. A
process speaking and writing from within the same or an adjacent cultural perspective
would better prepare us to make sense of traumatic narratives. The flip side of a minority
view is in not essentializing either larger cultural constructions as hegemonic (i.e. Latinx
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over disparate national identities) or generalizing an individual’s perspective into a global
one. These will be our problematics as we enter the analysis of Gloria Anzaldua’s work, a
theorist and thinker whose ideas will ramify and bind our readings in psychoanalysis and
literary theory into a concrete theory that will consolidate and synergize them all.

The Phenomenology of Trauma - Anzaldua (Un)Bound
Our question, when redirected at a writer, thinker, poet, activist, feminist,
Chicana, and lesbian like Gloria Anzaldua is, in a certain light, the question regarding
why I chose to sketch out her identity, her self, her being, with the sequence of identifiers
just listed. These do not exhaust the categories Anzaldua situates herself within, nor the
labels she co-opts in her works. And indeed the plausibility of either categories or labels
as notions sufficient for the delineation of a person or individual is vehemently
questioned by Anzaldua, her ontology of self being in this respect aware of Heidegger
and Derrida’s anti-essentialisms. But a plumbing of the depths, the riches, that
Anzaldua’s work offers to this project could begin by asking not why she has come to
determine herself, albeit provisionally, with various intersectional positions, but how she
came to this determination and how she continues, in her writings, to re-evaluate and
recycle the past-into-present, and the present-into-future. The usual apprehensions may
accompany such questions: what’s the use of talking about the ordinary, the mundane?
Simply put: so that we might break free from what makes it ordinary, and rediscover the
radical implemented in our most primordial activities; So that we may unearth once more
the distinction between philosophy and poetry, theory and praxis, and craft a third space
incarnated from our deepest memories and most resonant stories; So that we may better
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comprehend and appreciate the re-processing of writing and how its ripples extend to an
expansion of self and identity in what Homi Bhabha terms the “locations of culture”. In
short, Anzaldua’s texts stand to influence thinking about auto-theory and auto-biography,
and her contributions towards its evolution into a new stage of less past-thinking and
more creative forward-thinking production; a production, we might venture to suggest,
that will set the stage for our understanding of a new subculture’s reclamation.
Any reading of Anzaldua’s work must begin with the titular concept of the
“borderlands”. Just as common an approach to understanding such borderlands is through
geography, a set of situational assumptions derived from Anzaldua’s subjective
placement on and around an actual physical border (The U.S. Southwest’s abutting
Mexico itself). This however would be a mistake. As Anzaldua clarifies in her preface to
the book itself, the geography is secondary to (or at least distinguishable from) the
“psychological borderlands, the sexual borderlands and the spiritual borderlands [which]
are not particular to the Southwest.” (Borderlands, preface) What actually interests her
are the frictions, the torsions, the points of contact where the rubber of one culture or
mindset meets the road of another. And these clashes, in turn, re-present themselves in
physical space. The process resembles a hermeneutic circle as Heidegger would see it,
one without clearly defined levels or margins and with many entrances and exits. Most
importantly, the figure allows for an ambiguous and anti-foundationalist thinking that
does not require something of the logocentric preference for origins to intrude; for our
purposes, the chicken-or-the-egg conundrum of body/psyche/world is resolved by
Heidegger’s resonant description of being-in-the-world, and the equiprimordiality of self
to one’s factical circumstances and vice-versa. And Anzaldua takes up this formulation,
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as she often describes the distinction between body (i.e. both the corporal self and the
material world) and mind (i.e. the thinking self, consciousness, and spirituality or the
metaphysical) as an illusion, if not an altogether malicious scheme of heterosexist
Western thinking.
The primacy of this particular facet of Anzaldua’s theory points to her
materialistic conception of reality and the deep connection of self to culture, history, and
place. While she is through and through a spiritual writer and being, there is one side of
her that is undeniably steeped in the physical world. Our interests will be in this region of
her ontology, as it draws a direct path from geopolitics to self to culture to history and
back again. So, for example, Anzaldua herself stands atop the historical frontier and site
of imperialist power-exertion par excellence, the American Southwest, and embodies a
variegated identity derived from the very factuality of those border tensions; the mix of
languages (Spanish, English, Indigenous languages, blends of two or more of each) she
uses, her class position, her racial background, and her spiritual modes all derive from
one or more clashes, breaks, and fusions born from imperialist practice and resulting in
hybridical identity.
A discourse, a web of signs, overlays the phenomenon of border culture, one in
which power relations encode the very relation of self and other into the land itself. The
nature of borders is, according to Anzaldua, “to distinguish us from them.” (BL, 25) And
it is these same dividing practices at a national stage that delimit and prepare the context
for a wholesale denigration of a culture, a history, a people. The process, moreover,
follows a schema imbued in affective response, in trauma as embodied in its subjectvessels, individuals and communities bearing the weight of the past in their continued
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living conditions. This is why Anzaldua sees the borderlands as an interzone split
between discourses, set without dominant cultures and created “by the emotional residue
of an unnatural boundary.” (Borderlands, 25) It is indeed the same reason behind why
“the prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants”, as the forces that brand them as such
are the same as those that begot the interstice of the borderlands as an inhospitable,
reductive, and divisive space.
The most significant ramifications of this commingled history and origin for our
reading are threefold: firstly, the question of trauma not only culturally and filially
inherited, but sourceable to multiple distinct discourses or traditions and constitutive of
the border culture Anzaldua theorizes recurrently about; secondly, the condition of a
subject thrown into this condition, and its implications not only for a distinct worldedness
and practical hermeneutic/meaning-creating activity but for a radically different
existential analytic with different priorities and unique perspectives; and thirdly, the sui
generis composition of writing, spirituality, resistance, self, affect, ontology, and ethic
that, together with the two prior qualities, simultaneously shifts itself into the space left
behind by phenomenological description and formulates a new theory that culminates in a
praxis of self. To put it another way, Anzaldua spells the end of phenomenology and even
puts psychoanalysis into question and on its heels, by taking objectivizing forms as a
foundation that undoes itself in the process of creating a more robust mestiza/third-world
consciousness better inoculated against the pathologies of oppressive systems. In effect,
many of the problematics of traditional metaphysics, psychology, ontology (i.e. Western
sciences) are circumvented in the committed writing of a fuller self into being, an
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immune system responsive to repeated trauma received from culture, family, place,
history, and structure.

A Life claimed in Wounds: the Pains of a Queer Chicana Poet
As has been alluded to thus far, the event of the borderland’s “genesis” may itself
be regarded as traumatic in character, one that is shocking and divisive in impact. The
geopolitical circumstances of the American southwest and the cultural memory begotten
by what has transpired there over the past 150 years correspond, with a discourse and
symbolic system denoting break, assailment, fragmentation, fear, and suppression
becoming the norm. Anzaldua characterizes her experience in a totality where the pain
sourced from that traumatic assault on the cultural psyche and memory of people ripples
down to her, and vice versa; and this continuum of pain is one against which her
positionality identifies itself and departs from, the leaving manifesting as an agonized
absconding from her origins into herself. Not unlike Freud and Caruth’s descriptions of
trauma, Anzaldua discovers an identity born from the ashes of personal calamity. And
this identity reaches across gaps redolent of the panoply of errata handed down by
western philosophy: the mind/body split, the dessication of spirituality, a virtually
telepathic and elided sixth sense, and the depths of archetypal unconsciousness.
The place Anzaldua writes about — her natal Aztlan, the American Southwest
and Mexican Northeast, as well as the border regions themselves — are the hotbed from
which springs her soul and spirit, literally. And Anzaldua goes to great lengths to
emphasize this place’s pained beginnings: “The U.S. - Mexican border es una herida
abierta where the Third World grates against the first and bleeds.” (25) Similar yet
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different from the personal and historical wounds we have looked at so far, Chicanx
culture has woven into its very fabric a geographical wound, a subculture formed through
material lopped off of one part from the whole, a child from its parent culture. The
contact scrapes and bruises, hemorrhaging into a pool that nevertheless creates something
new. This same moment of departure is traumatic in structure, and defines the cultural
identity someone like Anzaldua will write about in her poetry: “1,950 mile-long open
wound/dividing a pueblo, a culture,/ running down the length of my body/staking fence
rods in my flesh,/splits me

splits me/me raja

me raja” (Borderlands, 24)

Anzaldua is pointing out a factical and embodied circumstance of her time and place: she
is a border-being, one of “los atravesados” for whom the claws of domination and
hegemony lurk around every corner. And among these, people of Chicanx heritage are of
a cultural background and worldedness for which the physical border-wall is a destructive
and traumatizing force, the material condition rending the cultural imagination and
memory of a people long at the center of a continental divide. Anzaldua’s representation
of that pain as lesions, cuts, bruises, and wounds on the body stand in for a similarly
invasive assault on the body-as-culture and the culture-as-body, an indivisibility of the
usual divorcing of the two. Human beings acculturated according to a world they are
thrown into, Anzaldua is saying, will feel as flesh torn from flesh when their world is set
ablaze. This loss is described by Anzaldua in her brief history of Chicanx culture, where
the loss of land by Anglo-American colonization is the same as being “jerked out by the
roots, truncated, disemboweled, dispossessed, and separated from our identity and our
history.” (Borderlands, 30) The material resources and arable land wrenched from her
forebears is likened to a corporal extraction, extirpation in the purest and most appalling
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sense. The moment of traumatic break, one Freud defines as crucial to traumatic
experience and which Caruth clarifies to be unfathomable to those who have experienced
it nevertheless hypostasize as Anzaldua’s being-in-the-world, in the preconcious level of
cultural meanings infused into her very way of seeing and walking through her world.
As has been shown, then, Anzaldua’s language and concepts follow from a
condition that appropriately incorporates embodied perception into concept, spirit, and
praxis. It follows that Anzaldua is able to visualize a direct connection between place and
culture or consciousness, a link at the level of meaning creation she can return to
intermittently as part of Nepantla and auto-writing. Indeed, the harm inflicted by Anglo
colonization is — she is insistent on this — not only corporal but spiritual, that the
damage is done not just to the body, but to the soul. This ensouled quality or mode is
something she elsewhere designates as a process resembling meaning-making. She
describes, for example, her habit of “look[ing] for omens everywhere, everywhere
catch[ing] glimpses of the patterns and cycles of [her] life”10, a practice indicating the
direct co-constitution of place and self. What Anzaldua calls spirit we can then, for our
purposes, surmise to be roughly translatable to the practice of assigning and receiving
meaning to and from the worlds of our practical concern. This practice would be opposed
to “objective reality”, Heidegger’s term for a quasi-mathematical reality which subtends
our own worldedness but at the same time is devoid of signification. Anzaldua’s criticism
of a philosophy unconcerned with cultural and historical meaning and circumstance is
rightly directed at European traditions foisted upon non-westerners:

10

(Borderlands, 58)
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They [Western Anthropologists] are fascinated by what they call the
‘magical’ mind, the ‘savage’ mind, the participation mystique of the mind
that says the world of the imagination — the world of the soul — and of
the spirit is just as real as psychical reality. In trying to become
‘objective,’ Western culture made ‘objects’ of things and people when it
distanced itself from them, thereby losing ‘touch’ with them. This
dichotomy is the root of all violence. (BL, 59)
The division of sense from objects, and objects from their senses, is the original sin, the
cardinal point of assault where the wedge is driven into the colonial subject by imperial
dominators. This break is what allows culture to be lost, and is the primary process the
recurrence of which Anzaldua is combatting, on that wants her to “forget that every cell
in our bodies, every bone and bird and worm has spirit in it.” (BL, 58)
This eurocentric determination against alternative realities is ardently criticized by
Anzaldua as anti-life, and destructive towards indigeneity, queerness, and femininity,
among others. It is the source both of the damage done to her, and yet also the source for
her liberatory epistemology. “La facultad” is one segment of the epistemology she
constructs in Borderlands/La Frontera, a property integrated into her psyche like a sixth
sense which is at the same time utterly contingent and melded to painful and traumatic
experiences (including the sudden divorcing from cultural totalities characteristic of
European colonial domination in the region). Anzaldua cites the experience of pain, fear,
and other affects commonly interpreted as debilitating to the self as a source for the self’s
defense mechanisms in La facultad, a unique capacity all the more common in those
caught between worlds 11. Her vision is not limited to the physical, either, as the assault
transcends into the spiritual realm as “susto”, “a sudden shock or fall that frightens the

“Pain makes us acutely anxious to avoid more of it, so we hone that radar. It’s a kind of survival tactic
that people, caught between the worlds, unknowingly cultivate. It is latent in all of us.” (61)
11
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soul out of the body.” (BL, 60) So pain runs the gamut from material conditions into
consciousness, from the ground up, and Anzaldua continues to detail with remarkable
perspicuity a continuum of concepts located at every step of the way. Eventually the
entirety of one’s being is focused into a defensive scheme, a fortress of solitude:
It is an instant ‘sensing,’ a quick perception arrived at without conscious
reasoning. It is an acute awareness mediated by the part of psyche that
does not speak, that communicates in images and symbols which are the
faces of feelings, that is behind which feelings reside/hide. The one
possessing this sensitivity is excruciatingly alive to the world.” (BL, 60)
The whole is not deducible from this quick ‘sensing’, but actionable, a coherent motor
organization calibrated towards the prevention of further exterior traumatic stimuli; the
system has defined itself by pain, and thus innoculated itself by withdrawals into
adamantine shells. The result is a painless, effortless, seamless registry of significant
object-beings as they present hazards to the self. And, as much as Anzaldua might
emphasize a metaphysical component, la facultad manifests as a “quick perception”
displaying a material basis in the body in this particular articulation. The bridging of the
mind body split is a spirited being, one vulnerable enough to suggestion or stimulation to
demand a shield, no matter the cost. And this impulse to defend has no small pedigree,
harkening back to the death drive/pleasure principle dichotomy and duel of fates: it is
itself the impulse to repeat, the terrorizing mechanism, which propounds the murky, vile
doctrine in order to protract the life of the organism. In this same order, Anzaldua
sacrifices one part of herself to enlarge and enbolden the other — a pound of flesh, in
return for a piece of heart. Her self-recreation is, in effect, not painless, but pain-bound, a
waltz of anguish playing along to the melody of one’s autocreation as an autoimmune
reaction. Of course, this self is equa-primordial with Heidegger’s “They-self”, so the
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resolute breaching into the individuality of one’s divergence from the herd defines one’s
propinquity and tendency to sloughing off the mold as soon as it has cracked under the
pressure of limitations and stagnation, a rebirth through the cracks.
Just as importantly is the binary-breaking trope of pain itself, which sets forth
destruction and creation from seemingly two separate ends of the spectrum. Pain writes
both, a re-integration of the traumatic memory into full self-narrative — one’s autohistoria, as Anzaldua may reference. And it is obvious that the recreation, the speakingback-to, the definition by division, by difference, operates on the axis of compulsions.
After all, Anzaldua herself mentions this recurrence, albeit in a negative cast: “In order to
escape the threat of shame or fear, one takes on a compulsive, repetitious activity as
though to busy oneself, to distract oneself (BL, 67) Together, however, with her presence
of mind and volitional expansion and envelope-pushing, her discourse periodically
expands by just this compulsion towards anguish, self-destruction, a tracking towards that
retreating wound. Just as Derrida points to the inability to fully articulate one’s being —
thrown as we are into the differance and trace-logic of language and speech, both
temporal and deferred by structure and unconsciousness — Anzaldua embellishes the
graceful impossibility, the hopeful unfathomability of the self. It is in its secrets, she
reminds us, that our greatest futures await.

The Shadow is our Tyrant, and our Savior: A Reformatting of Ourselves
Fitting the themes we’ve so far established of duality and of difference through
otherness, Anzaldua’s figures and totems of the other in oneself and of the decline
preceding the rebirth situate a new set of terms. These are ideas and semiotic systems she

50

writes into existence, creates the language for out of the sundry recourses to past
experience, memory, and cultural roots. And they are similarly intriguing for their
inclusion of otherness as psychically internalized, a development which permits
Anzaldua to take action from out of the depths of the lowest lows and into the most
exalted highs. Her vocabulary is willfully and enthusiastically hybrid, one that fuses
insights from psychoanalysis, western anthropology, meso-american spirituality and
myth, feminism, and queer theory. But there is more: an indomitable agency and spirit
that refuses theorization drives her committed and passionate involvement. This drive is
manifest in Anzaldua’s inner turbulence and strife with the symbols of fear, the
unconscious, depression and anxiety; they are the Serpent, the Shadow-Beast and the
Coatlicue State, respectively.
The Serpent is a figure that looms especially large in Anzaldua’s imagination, one
she recounts best in a memory of her reprimanding mother, and a corresponding late
night — a dark night of the soul? — in which she confronted the external hallucination or
condensed symbol of her unconscious drives. It’s role in the unconscious is undeniable
as, descanting on the Serpent, Anzaldua has this to say: “I realized she was, in my
psyche, the mental picture and symbol of the instinctual in its collective impersona, prehuman. She, the symbol of the dark sexual drive, the chthonic (underworld), the
feminine, the serpentine movement of sexuality, of creativity, the basis of all energy and
life.” (Borderlands, 57) Anzaldua’s re-interpretation of her ancestral past recovers a
beautiful spore of change concealed by a horror, an ancient symbology displaced by a
traumatic event — the elimination of matriarchal culture by patriarchal values — and
codified as demonic, abhorrent, toxic. It is in her direct confrontation with this speaking

51

wound of culture, as Caruth would call it, that Anzaldua solves the puzzle of her own
conflict with its values. And she achieves this by a historical literacy and close reading of
meso-american and, in particular, Aztec culture, one which denigrated and denounced the
honorary feminine in favor of the bloodlust of masculine war-dieties (Borderlands, 4953). In an act of authentic resoluteness (the Heideggerian description of determinations to
separate a distinct self from the “they-self”), she distances herself from the more
damaging and destructive aspects of her natal traditions while reconstructing and
salvaging constituents of her early past.
The Serpent is dually represented as the Shadow Beast. Their features seem to
have much in common at first blush, with Anzaldua telling of a grotesque basilisk-like
monstrosity that terrorizes her and the women of Chicana or indigenous heritage. The
difference lies in each creature’s origin: the Serpent is a cultural construct, an archetype
foisted upon little girls in Mexican/Chicanx culture. Contrast this with the Shadow-Beast,
Anzaldua’s creation and representation of her unconscious will as well as her fears,
impulses, drives, and other qualities antithetical towards the self. There is a more linear
relation implicit in both figures: the Serpent imbues itself into the unconscious from early
childhood by way of acculturation, and holds in its grip the child’s delicate psyche until
all fear itself takes on the form of the Serpent. The twinning effect we want to home in on
is Anzaldua’s exhortation to consciousness of the dual imposition and demonization of
the serpent archetype, a simultaneous vilification of the serpent and its installation as
internal policeman in the hearts of young girls especially from an early age. The binary of
human and monster and masculine and feminine are matched in patriarchal culture,
Anzaldua tells us, and liberating the individualizing and revolutionary potential of the
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feminine also means confronting the beast in the mirror, something “not many jump at…
without flinching at her lidless eyes.” (Borderlands, 42) It is in fact the learned
helplessness, the complicity in one’s own imprisonment Anzaldua targets: “Most of us
unconsciously believe that if we reveal this unacceptable aspect of the self our
mother/culture/race will totally reject us. To avoid rejection, some of us conform to the
values of the culture, push the unacceptable parts into the shadows.” (Borderlands, 42)
This fear of confrontation and suppression of the feminine escapes to the unconscious,
the other within oneself. It is here that Anzaldua draws the battle lines and revives the
otherness within herself. And what is most important to realize is the nature of this
combat: rather than fighting external political struggles exclusively, Anzaldua proposes
that we bring the fight home, exorcizing our innermost demons. It is this praxis that
resembles a phenomenological twist, an inner gaze and a return to understanding the
world as she sees it in her particular hermeneutic subjectivity. It is in reclamation and
observance of this world of meaning that resolution lies dormant; and it is in the belly of
the beast that the prospect of a newly healed self awaits in.
And so we arrive at the Coatlicue State. To Anzaldua, this further paining and
deepening of anguish is paramount to resolution — a darkening night before a new dawn.
She repeatedly iterates the dour ambiguity and smirking perplexity in the creature’s
smile, doubling as it does its meanings in her imagination: fear and hope, desire and
despair, blood and love. It can be everything or nothing, and its gaze is everything: “A
glance can freeze us in place; it can ‘possess’ us. It can erect a barrier against the world.
But in a glance also lies awareness, knowledge.” (64) Anzaldua has already, at this point
in the text, discussed gazes and their paralyzing potentiality. And here the idea is
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recycled, pointing towards the same pain-schema which directs epistemological
breakthroughs, only in a eerier ambiguity, a non-decision with ramifications for the
speaker in their listening. This would be in her remaining faculties, her volition:
The ability to respond is what is meant by responsibility, yet our cultures
take away our ability to act — shackle us in the name of protection.
Blocked, immobilized, we can’t move forward, can’t move backwards.
That writhing serpent movement, the very movement of life, swifter than
lightning, frozen. (BL, 42-43)
The serpent can freeze you, while also freeing you; its symbology runs deeply,
And most vitally, as a coagulant, a mortar-like mixture binding opposites down to their
interstitial gaps. Anzaldua’s inner symbology reappears, reflects, deep in the soul’s
depths, a re-evaluation of the self: “When I was older I would look into the mirror, afraid
of mi secreto terrible, the secret sin I tried to conceal — la sena, the mark of the Beast …
.” (64-5) What cannot be stated enough is just how radical Anzaldua’s interpretation
really is: discovering that her inner demon is in fact her archetype, the Jungian double
which stands for the inmost practices and virtues which comprise the most rarefied
actualizations of oneself. And for Anzaldua, this figure is profoundly ambivalent,
bending in every possible direction at seemingly the same time. Finally, she can accept
the function of the Coatlicue state, of the pained spirals of remembrance and wallowing
in despair: they are “exactly what propel the soul to do its work: make soul, increase
consciousness of itself.” Indeed, “Our greatest disappointments and painful experiences
— if we can make meaning out of them — can lead us toward becoming more of who we
are. Or they can remain meaningless. The Coatlicue state can be a way station or it can be
a way of life.” (68) A life without pain is no life at all. Not because pain is necessary for
us to exist, but that we are most fully ourselves, most fully alive, when we can rebound
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by reconstruction, dispensing with elaborate wounds by reincorporation, by scarring over.
A scarring which, it cannot be dismissed, is a return to an intentional and deliberate
critical consciousness alive to critique of dominant discourses through perception and by
way of a new ontology; a revival of the oppressed and damaged self that in the process
recognizes its own imperfectability, and proceeds nonetheless.

Beyond Good and Evil: Refashioning Ourselves as Healing
Nepantla consciousness is the term Anzaldua arrives at many years after the
publication of Borderlands/La Frontera. It is a development of “Mestiza Consciousness”,
a realm of thinking known for its ambiguities and ambivalences, its disruptive flair as
well as its vehemently hybrid expression. The reference to Nietzsche’s book in the above
subtitle ought to be suggestive of her intentions: to elaborate on her cultural history in
addition to her personal one, and in the process break apart the calcified mold of tradition
and into herself, a sui generis existence in the world. Anzaldua embraces differences in
her self constitution, and therefore survives the most reductive and reducing experiences
one can as a human-being: micro-aggression, racism, sexism, homophobia, and outright
physical and psychic trauma. And it is in her description of this inter-space conducive to
altogether superior memory and self-creating event that we might discover the healing
potentialities of such an occurrence. And so deconstructing the language and hybridity of
Nepantla will focus our analysis into the concrete moment of survival by deconstruction,
a taking on of responsibilities and volition in the face of mass meaninglessness and
nihilism; answering the call, in other words, for authentic experience and creation de
novo of meaning.
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Never, though, ex nihilo. In her preface to Light in the Dark/Luz en lo Oscuro,
“Gestures of the Body”, Anzaldua maps out her development of key ideas originally
reported on in Borderlands/La Frontera, with essential milestones in her experimental
timeline are amplified and refined. Here, the notion of “Nepantla” receives its initial and
most succinct treatment, stating how “Nepantla is the place where my cultural and
personal codes clash, where I come up against the world’s dictates, where these different
words coalesce in my writing. . . Nepantala is the point of contact y el lugar between
worlds — between imagination and physical existence, between ordinary and
nonordinary (spirit) realities.” (2) Anzaldua staggers us once more with her metaphorical
display: the gap within which, as Derrida reminds us, is the premier scene of writing, and
thus creation, is now hers to command. She makes camp in this interstitial space,
repeatedly and perpetually renovating her sense of self at the heart of creation itself. And
what preserves her participation in this markedly and inveterately difficult-to-inhabit
positionality? None other than her writing practice, her direct engagement in remapping
the bodily gestures and points of articulation suffered in trauma into the self’s code, in its
practical sense-making within its everyday world, to the analytic and spiritual ideas
repeated routinely and on a daily basis. And this in spite of Derrida’s maintenance of a
fragmentary, ghostlike identity within which we persist as a trace across time and
temporal axes: “The sheer mental, emotional, and spiritual anguish motivates me to
‘write out’ my/our experiences. More than that, my aspirations towards wholeness
maintain my sanity, a matter of life and death.” (Light in the Dark (hereby LITD), 2) The
desire to reconstitute oneself may as well be inherent, so second-nature is it to
Anzaldua’s life-force. It calls for breaking new ground in order to shield identity from the
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slings and arrows of outrageous fortune (that is, colonial, racist, and sexist microaggressions deliberate and not) Moreover, the impulse and idealism of completion is
foregrounded in spite of its immanent self-defeat. Why? Because it is in enacting that
will to completion, to wholeness, that wholeness is not fulfilled but put into practice,
therefore endowed with animation as part of a life-as-temporality, an activity sustained
by continual renovation of this will and desire to participate in existence.
This continual renovation has a double motivation, outgrowths of a primary
valuation of fortifying and extending the self with la facultad: the traumatic origin,
tracing further back than the previous few generations and practically into the DNA of
those descendants of victims of historical atrocity. It begins with a historical grievance, as
well as one for the everyday minutiae: “Each irritant is a grain of sand in the oyster of the
imagination. Sometimes what accretes around an irritant or wound may produce a pearl
of great insight, a theory.” (LITD, 2) Each moment in isolation does not cohere without
the overarching sense of la facultad, a reflex imbued with an anxious energy straddling
the pleasure principle and death drive. If the wound speaks, it requires a listener, a
witness to the damage who will appraise its pain and pass judgment on its perpetrator.
The concatenations she puts together amount to a syntactical unit, furnishing sense to
what was once only disordered stimuli unevenly arranged and outside all rational
legibility. And this sense-giving act will form a coherent whole in the arena of
Anzaldua’s epistemological modes, among them Nepantla.
To a certain degree, Nepantla modes are ends in themselves: they allow one to
access tensions, a differential consciousnesses of phenomena common to experience
unearthed in a new light. To another eye, Nepantla is a means to an end, one in which
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Anzaldua believes she is better able to write, and in turn “idear”, a procedure where she
becomes comfortable “develop[ing] an epistemology of the imagination, a psychology of
the image” where she can “construct [her] own symbolic system.” (LITD, 2) To
Anzaldua, the act of writing stems from a Nepantla consciousness, and enables her to
engage with reality in a creatively self-affirming mode, one where she bears witness to
her production of self. The activity of writing, resembling the same psychoanalytic
premises surmised in our earlier readings of Freud and Caruth, becomes one in which
Anzaldua ceaselessly retrospects for the sake of reforming the future, a hermeneutic of
liberation — and one embedded in the recovery of one’s own narrative memory into a
cogent one, resolved from the traumatic exclusions jeopardizing its temporal integrity.
The image this process engenders can appear paradoxical and aporetic:
Intento dar testimonio de mi propio proceso y conciencia de escritora
chicana. Soy la que escribe y se escribe/I am the one who writes and who
is being written. Últimamente es el escribir que me escribe/ It is the
writing that ‘writes’ me. I ‘read’ and ‘speak’ myself into being. (LITD, 3)
She processes and works through by — against everything Felman, Laub, and Caruth
would suppose — bearing witness to herself. She is herself the site of being changed and
doing the changing, having her cake and eating it too. But in fact, Anzaldua’s move is
lateral, accessing the inherited and available discourses of collective myth and memory.
This is an understandable response, given that the act of testimony has been ripped from
her arsenal subjectivity by colonizing discourses: Anzaldua is faced with the internal
looping traps of traumatic experience. Her saving grace is the defenses of the collective,
shared cultural memory, the inheritance and reapplication of which is already a deeply
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critical act. More yet in the act of writing, where, as Anzaldua describes it, a historically
bound subjectivity and worldedness is being painfully reinscribed
And the passage's bilinguality only reinforces this reading, demonstrating two of
her several conflicted identities and dichotomy of the meanings produced in Spanish, in
English, and from both juxtaposed together. A seemingly liquid spirit connects the two
expressions in act symbolizing collective and coalitional action. Her representation of
multiple identities is proof positive for allied political actions. Not coincidentally, then,
Anzaldua is much more concerned with writing as a spiritual act in Light in the Dark/Luz
en lo Oscuro than she was in Borderlands/La Frontera, the corresponding salient feature
of the latter consisting in spirituality and religion. Where the older book copes with the
mythologies of others handed down to her, the newer one affords a mundane task with
spiritual properties equal to the task of inspiring the creation of an entirely new self. This
time, furthermore, in a much more materially grounded form more disposed to political
action. It is the body itself on which writing is performed, directed, and thus the
recognition of the language and discourse a material entity carries is brought to the
center. Anzaldua confirms this, remarking on how “writing is a gesture of the body, a
gesture of creativity, a working from the inside out . . . the body is the ground of thought.
The body is a text.” (LITD, 5) Recovering the factical circumstances of oneself as an
embodied being allow one to rediscover the wounded body, the self as carnal, etched in
blood with claws sharp enough to dig deep. Until this reality is unearthed, then the signs
of traumatic experience will speak with disembodied voices, and a response — in writing
conscious of itself and its limited corporeal state — along the same venues where the
damage was done, individually and collectively, in the first place. And so Anzaldua’s
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politics, already so imbued with spirit and co-extensive with activism, finds another
outlet in writing, and therefore directly imprints itself onto the body and the material
world. As far as her epistemology is concerned, it is more an ontology; and as far as her
ontology is concerned, it is more a theory of contingent subjectivity. And is that not just
the same as literature, as poetry?
The culmination of this work are the dynamic tandem of “autohistoria” and
“autohistoria-teoria”, translatable roughly to auto-history and autohistory-theory. They
are modes or moods Anzaldua uncovers as part of what she identifies as the continual
death and rebirth cycle of the oppressed self, a cycle she deliberately codifies into her
writing. The writing she produces is this autohistoria, itself a codification, an archiving
of oneself as testimonial, as record.
A similar course was run by European Continental philosophy in the 20th century,
one diverging from metaphysics to existence philosophy and politics. What distinguishes
autohistoria is a critical, or what we could even refer to as deconstructive, attitude which
denies a pure authority to tradition and calcified common discourse. This resembles the
rejection of the natural attitude characteristic of Husserlian phenomenology, an idea
invested in a return to actual and essential features of consciousness. After passing
through Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Derrida, however, the same axiom undergoes
revolutionary revision: “consciousness” becomes existence, the body, and the text; the
“natural attitude” becomes a critique of historical constructs and discourses; and
“essence” becomes contingency, history, and subjectivity. Where then does that leave us,
when confronted with a perspective like Anzaldua’s? A critical, nonconformist,
heterodox, fluid identity takes shape: the conclusions given by this strand of Continental
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thought come full circle, returning to the root of phenomenological thought – the
subject’s experience of their world – and rejuvenates it by embodying what European
philosophers have only just begun to catch onto. Anzaldua’s lived experience represents a
fuller potential for authentic living by not only undoing binaristic thinking in a theoretical
or textual vein, but expanding the text to the living body and swirling spirit, in addition to
making it a conscientous personal habit or practice. The corrolary of phenomenology is to
disclose the self, a self, an individual thrown into a set of circumstances not of their own
choosing, into a material and corporeal existence, one fraught by the wounds of racial
conflict, gender oppression, colonial persecution, and hetero-hegemony. It becomes the
imperative of that individual not to philosophize in grandiloquent tones about
firmaments, but to entrench themselves into their ownmost possibilities and projects, the
meanings culturally native to them, and the search for their own and other’s freedoms.
But the practice does not end there, not with the individual. Autohistoria has a
basic communicative function, a social dimension written into its DNA. The foundation
of philosophy, according to thinkers like Hegel, Freud, or Nietzsche, is in describing
concrete realities and drawing conclusions from the grounds of this experience in the
world; pure reason and divine providence, in other words, ought to have no say.
Anzaldua parlays this assumption into one not only concerned with personal, individual
experiences, but the ways in which these individual’s experiences are sewn into larger,
collective struggles. She confirms the direct line from rewriting oneself to political events
when she states how “Conectando experiencias personales con realidades sociales results
in autohistoria, and theorizing about this activity results in autohistoria-teoria. It’s a way
of inventing and making knowledge, meaning, and identity through self-inscriptions.”

61

(LITD, 6) Anzaldua actively rejects any divisions from what we might consider distinct
areas of life (politics, the personal, the spiritual) in order to facilitate social engagement,
and autohistoria is her weapon of choice. All of this for the sake of “attempt[ing] to show
(and not just tell) how transformation happens.” (LITD, 7)

Conclusion: Nepantlera, Once More
The concept of nepantla, the liminal threshold within which fragmentating selves
float, in between decision, direction, and transformation, makeup the core of Anzaldua’s
process. The thread of nepantla reaches as far back as the inciting incident, the moment
of wounding. Referring to them as “arrebatos”, quaking raptures nearly throwing the soul
out of the body, Anzaldua relates unequivocally how these moments of shock transform
previous states into nepantla, a roadway between pasts and futures. (LITD, 17) Not
dissimilarly, phenomenology relies on breakages – whether a thuderclap, a strike of
inspiration, or a dispassionate withdrawal – that reveal features of the world previously
undisclosed to us; alternatively, in psychoanalysis, the represssive mechanisms of the
unconscious bar external threats (an analyst, or a sleuthy friend) from accessing repressed
material by invoking strong affective denials: only in eliciting unconscious material by
free-association, automatic writing, and talk therapy are creative connections are drawn
and meaning is created, putting an end to the neurosis. What Anzaldua appears to be
attempting is a synthetic amalgamation of the two: she retains the striking moments of
breakage, yet also reveres a fluent source of words, texts, ideas, meaning; a bridging
which paves the way for a reconstruction post-deconstruction, a program packaging
together the self, critique, change, and activism under a single guiding light.
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Until then, Anzaldua commits herself to instances of nepantla as chances for
growth, for creation. The founding split repeats, the birth of the borderlands reappears as
compulsion, and the cracks turn to hard pavement. But in looking that death in the face,
Anzaldua unearths new life. As she redefined Coatlicue as a savior goddess, avows her
ambiguity as the goddess of both life and death, the compulsion to re-enact the traumas of
colonization of the land and its people forces her to ravage herself in the same kind of
splitting. Only this time, Anzaldua will turn it to her advantage. Trauma may be
perpetually repeatable, but nothing repeats perfectly: iterability will dictate a difference,
every time. So if she is condemned to that past, to a tragic revision of its origins, then so
be it — but she will force it, bend it to her will, to fashion a being that commands its
wounds, not the other way around. Imposing her will, she rescues herself from extinction
– and her doing it within the liminal space of nepantla is what will earn her the title of
nepantlera, a shamanisitic creator who embraces agony and struggle in order to surpass
her wounded selves and commit to a conscious activism.
Work like Anzaldua’s will therefore never be concerned with impeccable logical
consistency or theoretical coherency, and therefore should not be read as such: she is
after all not after conceptual rigor, but self-awakening. At the same time, the peculiarly
literary qualities of her work do not prevail either, with sheer poetry being punctuated by
assertion, exhortation, demands, critique, and so on. Anzaldua, true to her form, enacts a
structure dispelling the old myths of philosophy and poetry, a dichotomy sealed by
histories both Western and otherwise; and in its place, resolves a form of writing
concealed underneath the binary (a phenomenological move), one constitutive of selftowards-the-future while at the same time resolutely attesting to the past. Anzaldua’s
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writing, in other words, is one that builds her sense of identity in the process of its
creation, a reclamation and an oppositional criticism that discovers as it regenerates,
incorporating each finding into the body as a tattoo etched on bare skin. We may refer to
this act by many names: Chicana existentialism, Feminist phenomenology, Queer trauma
theory, Mestiza deconstruction. Anzaldua would accept all these and more, as she writes
on in a repetition of dismemberment and re-memberment, rebuilding what has been
struck down by dominant kyriarchical structures, and enlarging her power and presence
for the personal-in-politics, and towards a communal soul.
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